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Abstract 
Author: Teresa Shoemaker 
Title: Confucius Institutes in Context: An Investigation of Chinese Soft Power 
 
Supervising Professor: Dr. Michael Anderson 
 
This thesis strives to contribute to the literature on Chinese soft power and China’s 
involvement in Africa by answering the following research questions: What is soft power in the 
Chinese context, and how is it exercised in Africa? Why is that significant, and what does it tell 
us about China in Africa? After identifying distinct Chinese and Western definitions of soft 
power, the thesis uses both to analyze the case of Confucius Institutes (facilities for Chinese 
culture and language learning) in Kenya. It is concluded that the institutes are reflective of 
China’s overarching foreign policy goals. Despite distinct evaluations of the institutes arising 
from the Chinese and Western definitions of soft power, the term is still useful for understanding 
Chinese engagement with Africa. An implication for Chinese soft power is that it has potential 
for growth. The study also concludes Chinese involvement in Africa through the institutes has 
positive outcomes for Africa, and that Africa is instrumental to China’s rise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to express gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Anderson, and second reader, Dr. 
Maclachlan, for their insights and guidance. I would also like to thank all of the IRG and Plan II 
professors and faculty for providing excellent programs that consistently challenged my 
preconceived notions, always pushed me to investigate issues further, and complemented my 
passion for a life of learning. I’m also appreciative of my parents’ support throughout my 
undergraduate career and the thesis process. Last but not least, thank you Maxwell for the 
endless pep talks and pad thai that fueled me through college.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
Table of Contents 
 
Title Page           1 
Abstract           2 
Acknowledgments           3 
Table of Contents          4 
List of Abbreviations         6 
Research Objectives          7 
Methodology           8 
Chapter 
I Introduction         9 
   China’s Foreign Policy      11 
   Confucius Institutes       15  
Concluding Remarks       21 
 II Theoretical Framework        23 
Soft Power         23 
Soft Power in the Chinese Context     25 
Concluding Remarks        32 
    
III Kenya          34 
  Kenya’s Value as a Case Study     35 
Confucius Institutes In Kenya      40 
Confucius Institutes as Exemplary of Soft Power 
In the Chinese Context      41 
Confucius Institutes in Kenya According to the Western  
Conception of Soft Power       50 
 
IV Conclusion          54 
   The Significance for Soft Power in the Chinese Context 
   And Implications for China in Africa     54 
Conclusion        56 
 5 
 
Appendix           58 
Bibliography           59 
Biography           68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
Abbreviations 
 
CCTV   China Central Television 
CI   Confucius Institute 
CNP   Comprehensive National Power 
CPC   Communist Party of China1 
DAC   Development Assistance Committee 
EAC   East African Community 
EU   Egerton University 
FOCAC  Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
FTZ   Free Trade Zone 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
HSK   Chinese Language Proficiency Examination 
IO   International Organization 
KU   Kenyatta University 
LDC   Less Developed Country 
MU   Moi University 
NOTCFL  Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language 
NSE   Nairobi Securities Exchange 
OBOR   One Belt, One Road 
ODA   Official Development Assistance 
OECD   Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PRC   People’s Republic of China 
SGR   Standard Gauge Railway 
UoN   University of Nairobi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 While the translation ‘Chinese Communist Party’ (CCP) continues to be used in literature written by Western 
authors, the party has recently begun using ‘Communist Party of China’ (CPC) in English translations of its official 
documents and websites. This thesis will use the more recent ‘CPC’ translation. 
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Research Objectives 
 This thesis aims to contribute to scholarship concerning China’s soft power and 
involvement in Africa. Soft power in the Chinese context will be defined as a tool used towards 
China’s foreign policy objectives that is more flexible and expansive than the term as defined in 
the Western literature (‘co-optive’ power that originates from a society’s institutions, values, and 
culture, excluding military and economic factors). The Chinese soft power concept is more 
extensive in that it both impacts and is impacted by China’s image abroad. China’s soft power is 
a component of its comprehensive national power (CNP), and is an important consideration in its 
foreign policy because it informs China’s status as a global power and subsequently, ability to 
seek continued economic growth. 
Specific questions guiding this investigation are as follows: What is soft power in the 
Chinese context and how is it exercised in Africa? Why is this significant and what does it tell us 
about China in Africa? The relevance of these questions is several fold, as their answers will 
illuminate: 1) differences between Chinese and Western notions of soft power 2) China’s 
overarching foreign policy strategy 3) Africa’s significance for China’s policy goals, and the 
importance of China to Africa, and 4) any implications this discussion may have on the utility of 
soft power as a theoretical term, and as a real-world foreign policy tool. 
In order to reach an appropriate level of depth, the thesis will examine the case of 
Confucius Institutes in Kenya. Confucius Institutes (CIs) are venues for Chinese culture and 
Mandarin language learning abroad. There are currently 500 institutes worldwide. The institutes 
are frequently referenced as a resource of China’s soft power China. Kenya presents an 
interesting case study because it is of geographic interest to China, Kenyan officials are in favor 
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of educational cooperation with China as they perceive a knowledge-based economy as an 
appropriate route for growth, and Kenya is home to more CIs (four) than is typical for an African 
country (zero, one, or two). 
 
 
Methodology 
 After introducing relevant contextual information regarding China’s foreign policy and 
involvement in Africa, the thesis then introduces a theoretical framework of soft power to be 
used for analysis of Confucius Institutes in practice, and offers commentary on the significance 
of the findings. Many scholarly sources were used to grasp the debates at hand and gather data. 
The thesis makes use of a multitude of news sources, which should be interpreted as a strength, 
as it allowed the author to uncover the issues various stakeholders prioritize, and importantly, 
their attitudes and perceptions regarding these topics. Comprehending attitudes was significant 
for the research because soft power can be heavily dependent on sentiments. 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 While China’s engagement in Africa has garnered much attention in the last decade, ties 
between the two are rooted in history. In 1964, Zhou Enlai (the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC)’s first Premier) visited Africa. Zhao Ziyang, China’s Premier at the time, toured the 
continent in 1982. He visited eleven states in four weeks. His message was that of cooperation 
between China and Africa, and mutually beneficial South-South development. Many other 
instances of diplomatic contact have occurred in modern history, as well as conferences and 
partnerships. 
Western scholars tend to inquire about China’s intentions for the continent. In writing for 
the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), with the objective of informing Department of Defense and 
U.S. Army leaders, David Brown asserts “China’s four main interests in Africa are: securing 
natural resources, including petroleum and strategic minerals; tapping an emerging market that 
has great long-term potential and is underestimated by the West; securing political support from 
African nations in the United Nations (UN); and ensuring Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation.” 
China’s top priority among those goals “is to increase access to energy, minerals, and raw 
materials to fuel China’s rapid industrialization and emerging consumer society.”2 While not 
necessarily a consensus, many Western scholars discussing China’s role in Africa share this 
point of view.  
However, other scholars possess a more optimistic view, highlighting Africans’ general 
positivity in approaching China as a development model. A significant factor considered in this 
view is aid. China offers assistance in areas that other donors typically underserve – educational 
                                                
2 David E. Brown, Hidden Dragon, Crouching Lion: How China’s Advance in Africa is 
Underestimated and Africa’s Potential Underappreciated (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army 
War College, 2012), 1-2, 7. 
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scholarships, infrastructure, and production. Moreover, China has provided funds without 
stipulations requiring political reform, which differs from most of the standard Western packages 
that have the potential for causing instability as a result of reform demands. In addition, China 
does not make heavy use of structural adjustment loans as Western donors do. As for the purpose 
driving China’s aid programs, Deborah Brautigam observes that “China gives aid for three 
reasons: strategic diplomacy, commercial benefit, and as a reflection of society’s ideologies and 
values.” Brautigam considers aid provisions a foreign policy tool. From this perspective, the 
view that China is simply looking to gain resources is not an accurate representation of the 
situation.3 
Regardless of the authors’ opinion, various topics are common when observing China’s 
activity in Africa, including increasing trade and investment, construction and infrastructure 
projects, and political interactions, such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). 
These activities echo the relationship the PRC developed with Japan during its period of 
modernization – Japan provided technological insight and infrastructure, and China repaid in oil 
and the goods produced from the new equipment (the U.S. jumped on board soon after, investing 
in Chinese markets as well). There was also much traction in the media given to the mounting 
investments in both cases. A key takeaway is that China perceived these occurrences as helpful 
to its development. This history has informed the PRC’s own formation of aid deals for less 
developed countries (LDCs) and its general view of the possibility for ‘win-win’ cooperation that 
may exist between nation-states at various stages of development. Moreover, ‘aid’ in the 
                                                
3 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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traditional sense, i.e. one-directional assistance, was abandoned in favor of partnership, from 
which both parties could prosper. In this way, ‘aid’ became intimately related to investment.4 
 This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature by commenting on how Chinese soft 
power is exercised in Africa, and by noting its significance for China in Africa. In order to 
understand China’s involvement in Africa, it is useful to first understand China’s broader policy 
goals. 
China’s Foreign Policy  
 
 China’s foreign policy goals relevant to this thesis can be summarized as follows:  
 
China’s soft power-based rising strategy and its new foreign policy concepts seek to 
reassure other countries, especially the United States and China’s neighboring countries, 
that a rising China will not become a revisionist power by threatening world peace and 
regional stability.5 
 
This section will establish the background of that strategy and comment on its application to the 
discussion at hand. 
 In 1978, Deng Xiaoping initiated the ‘reform and opening up’ (gaige kaifang 改革开放) 
of China, in which the Chinese market liberalized and foreign direct investment (FDI) was 
invited into the state. The next few decades brought substantial growth. In 2001, China launched 
its ‘going out’ strategy (zou chuqu 走出去), which entailed a shift from encouraging FDI into 
China, to cultivating investments and manufacturing abroad. It also joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in the same year, and has become more active in international organizations 
(IOs) in general.  
In light of these economic changes and expanded involvement in global politics, the ‘rise 
of China’ has become an increasingly popular topic in international relations. Western scholars 
                                                
4 Ibid. 
5 Sheng Ding, “Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China's Rise to the 
Status Quo Power,” Journal of Contemporary China 19 no. 64, (March 2010): 267.  
 12 
tend to navigate China’s broadening strength and influence in the world through a lens that 
focuses upon the impact to the author’s own state. Some view China as a ‘revisionist’ power, 
able to usurp the status quo power’s (U.S.’s) hegemony. In this manner, certain scholars have 
indicated that China’s rise is antagonistic to the U.S.’s sustained global preeminence, whereas 
others contend Washington’s inaction is more responsible for the current and projected state of 
affairs, rather than China’s self-purporting campaigns.6 From the Chinese perspective, its recent 
successes are not indicative of a ‘rise,’ but rather, a ’rejuvenation,’ which implies a return to the 
great power status it previously championed, as opposed to the creation of something entirely 
new.7 Chinese scholars have termed the notion postulated within certain pieces of Western 
literature that China’s rise is a zero-sum game the ‘China threat’ theory. This theory has spurred 
great interest in government leaders and Chinese scholars on the topic of public diplomacy and 
soft power as means of offsetting China’s negative image in the West.8 After the Cold War, 
China increased its public diplomacy budget (while the United States substantially reduced its 
own).9  
In fact, improving its image abroad has dominated a significant share of China’s foreign 
policy dialogue and initiatives.10 In the early 2000’s, to quell the ‘China threat’ anxiety and strive 
                                                
6 Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power.” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science. 16, (March 2008), accessed November 3, 2016. 
7 Sheng Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises With its Soft Power (Plymouth, UK: Lexington 
Books, 2008).  
8 Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the rise of Chinese Soft Power” 
9Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power.” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 47 (June 2006), accessed November 10, 2016. 
10 International perceptions have been acknowledged in China’s foreign policy prior to its period of dramatic 
growth. Following the Communist Party’s ascension to power in China, the nation underwent three decades of self-
prescribed isolation until Deng Xiaoping initiated the reform era in 1978. In 1967, 75% of Americans held a ‘very 
unfavorable’ view of China, 16% held an ‘unfavorable opinion,’ and 5% held a ‘favorable opinion.’ In the beginning 
of the reform era, Chinese officials sought to address its poor image by establishing the ‘foreign propaganda with 
Chinese characteristics’ (Zhongguo tese de duiwai xuanchuan 中国特色的对外宣传) strategy to popularize a 
positive view of China (‘propaganda’ was revised to ‘publicity’ because of Western connotations of ‘propaganda’). 
While the 1980’s saw improvement in polling of China’s image, China faced a setback with its response to student 
demonstrations in 1989. 
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towards its broader policy goals, Chinese officials packaged China’s efforts as a ‘peaceful rise’ 
(heping jueqi 和平崛起), which later became  ‘peaceful development’ (heping fazhan 和平发
展).11 These phrases and the concepts they represent serve as China’s acknowledgment of 
conflict that has coincided with the rise of powers in the past, and is an attempt to explain its 
commitment to peace. China would like to instead propagate a ‘China opportunity’ sentiment. 
These efforts are a part of China’s broader aim towards global image management. The strategy 
acknowledges that “image and reputation have become essential parts of a state’s strategic 
capital.”12 There appears to be a scholarly consensus that China’s policy is intended to attain 
acceptance abroad, to grant China an agenda-setting role on the international stage, and to form 
an international climate favorable to China’s economic development. China’s overall aim is to 
gain a greater diplomatic presence and flourish economically while maintaining peaceful 
relations with other nations. Perhaps a more tacit reason driving the pursuit of image 
management is that attaining esteemed recognition abroad will grant the party internal legitimacy, 
allowing the regime to continue.13 In addition to China’s self-reported endeavors to counter the 
‘China Threat’ theory, Western analysis has identified other goals for China’s public diplomacy 
efforts, including attaining legitimacy and respect with regard to both its regime classification 
and its well-meaning intentions for its population. China also wants to be viewed positively in its 
economic partnerships and as a member of the global community.14  
                                                                                                                                                       
Sheng Ding, “Branding a Rising China: An Analysis of Beijing’s National Image Management in the Age of 
China’s Rise,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 46, no. 3 (2011): 297. 
11 Chinese leaders abandoned the ‘rise’ language in favor of ‘development’ in order to further distance China from 
aggressive connotations that may accompany ‘rise’ from some points of view. 
12 Van Ham, paraphrased in Sheng Ding, “Branding a Rising China: An Analysis of Beijing’s National Image 
Management in the Age of China’s Rise,” 294. 
13 Sheng Ding, “Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China's Rise to the 
Status Quo Power,” 257. 
14Ingrid d’Hooghe, “The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations.” Public Diplomacy in the 
People’s Republic of China. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
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 Within China, there is the belief that bolstering its ‘comprehensive national power’ 
(zonghe guoli 综合国力) is necessary to attain great power status, which is the primary means 
for achieving its goals of sustained economic growth without military conflict. The reasoning is 
that becoming a great power will enable China to make decisions in international relations that 
are pursuant to its economic interests. The nation’s “highest development strategy is to seek to 
build comprehensive national strength while maintaining internal stability.”15 Comprehensive 
national power (CNP) is the combination of a nation’s hard and soft power (to be explained 
further in the second chapter).16 It is within this framework that soft power, particularly its 
effective development and use, becomes a topic of interest for Chinese leaders. In other words, 
soft power is viewed as: 1) a component of the nation’s overall power and 2) a route towards 
improved image abroad, both of which will contribute to China’s increased capacity to make 
political decisions and maintain economic growth. Subsequently, the media, press, and cultural 
aspects of China have been purposefully launched abroad as tools in China’s soft power 
campaign.  
Confucius Institutes are one component of this endeavor. Numerous academicians 
propose these efforts are “intended to create and maintain an environment desirable for 
continued development in China.” In this way, the broader goal is to manufacture a 
representation of China that quells suspicions about its rapid economic growth and a world order 
in flux.17 As such, the country has linked its broader aspiration to enhance diplomatic and 
                                                
15 Sheng Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises With its Soft Power. 
16According to President Jiang Zemin, “the fundamental task of socialism is to develop productive forces, enhance 
the comprehensive national strength of our socialist country, and improve the people’s living standards and in this 
way reflect the superiority of socialism over capitalism.”   
Sheng Ding, “Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China's Rise to the 
Status Quo Power,” 264. 
17 Xiaolin Guo, “Repackaging Confucius: PRC Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Soft Power.” Institute for Security 
and Development Policy (January 2008): 9.  
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economic strength to the prevalence of the Chinese language internationally.18 Confucius 
Institutes are thereby a tangible solution for promoting Mandarin and Chinese culture abroad in 
order to achieve the intangible results China seeks (new avenues for economic growth without 
military conflict, agenda-setting capabilities, and general tolerance and influence). In this manner, 
the institutes are a reflection of China’s desire for a well-received image abroad. 
Confucius Institutes 
 While CIs are a relatively recent mechanism for teaching Chinese abroad, the state has 
pursued overseas Chinese language instruction for more than two decades. The National Office 
for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (NOTCFL), or Hanban, was established in 1987. 
Later, in 2004, the ‘Chinese Bridge’ Project was approved by China’s State Council, which 
constitutes Hanban’s primary mission.19 The project outlined eight goals, including: founding 
Confucius Institutes (CIs) abroad, producing ‘Great Wall Chinese’ and ‘Chengo Chinese’ 
(technology-based resources for Chinese language learning), launching Advanced Placement 
Chinese in 2,500 American institutions, aiding foreign universities in developing Chinese 
language libraries, and raising college level language proficiency.20  
Since inception, issues pertaining to CIs have graced the pages of official government 
documents, such as the National Outline for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and 
Development (2010-2020), the Ministry of Education’s current ten-year plan. Revising the 
teaching at CIs is articulated as a necessary undertaking for advancing CIs in the plan. A section 
titled “Major Projects and Pilot Reform Projects” mentions devoting resources to the 
                                                
18 Sheng Ding and Robert A. Saunders, “Talking Up China: An Analysis of China’s Rising Cultural Power and 
Global Promotion of the Chinese Language.” East Asia (Summer 2006), accessed January 5, 2017 
19 Ibid. 
20 “Eight Measures to Boost Overseas Chinese Teaching: Official.” China Education and Research Network, June 17 
2005, accessed October 24, 2016 
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establishment of CIs.21 The existence of deliberate attention to Confucius Institutes within 
official Chinese archives with inclusion of clearly defined goals for institute improvement 
illuminates the significant position CIs occupy within Chinese policy planning; the act of 
recording objectives for CIs substantiates their value. It also exhibits the state’s role in 
establishing CIs.  
Purpose of the Institutes 
 Hanban has explicitly stated several CI aims under the “general principles” section of the 
“Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes.” As enumerated, the intentions are as 
follows:  
Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people from different 
countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, to enhancing 
understanding of the Chinese language and culture by these peoples, to strengthening 
educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other countries, to 
deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting the development of 
multiculturalism, and to construct a harmonious world.22  
 
From language such as ‘enhancing understanding’ and ‘deepening friendly relationships,’ it can 
be inferred China is concerned with cultivating shared positive sentiment and tolerance, which 
parallels its broader foreign policy. The language used is quite revealing of Hanban’s goals; all 
statements begin with an affirmative, active verb that presumably will effect positive change, 
such as ‘satisfy,’ and ‘strengthen.’ The language of the goals was a success for image – none of 
the statements appear ill-intentioned or harmful; they seem to speak to the desire for global 
improvement and shared progress. According to the Ministry of Culture, teaching Chinese 
language in foreign countries “is of strategic significance…to enhance the friendship and mutual 
                                                
21 Hartig Falk, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 62, (2012), 
accessed January 3, 2017 
22 “Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes,” http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm, accessed 
January 6, 2017 
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understanding as well as the economic and cultural co-operation and exchanges between China 
and…the world and to elevate China’s influence in the international community.”23  
 Various Chinese authorities echo this message. According to the CI chief executive, Xu 
Lin, rather than wielding soft power, China ‘hopes to be truly understood by the rest of the 
world.’” Vice Premier of the State Council of China, Liu Yandong, urged CIs to continue 
“‘[helping] more foreigners to understand China’” during her speech celebrating the tenth 
anniversary of the institutes. This emphasis on the need for foreign actors to ‘understand’ China 
illuminates a fundamental Chinese belief: people living in states other than China lack proper 
information and misunderstand China, which must therefore explain their negative view of the 
country.24 Some scholars interpret CIs, and China’s public diplomacy, as attempting to showcase 
a “politically correct China to the world,” rather than the “real China.”25 From this perspective, 
the discrepancy between the ‘real’ and the ‘correct’ China (assuming they are not one in the 
same) portrayed to the international community “limits their ability to project China’s strategic 
narratives effectively and increase China’s soft power.”26 The disconnect between the authentic 
and advertised suggests a certain set of political ambitions, namely, to promote an image that 
will be well received by the targeted audience. 
 ‘C’ is for Confucius  
  ‘Traditional’ has increasingly become the Chinese government’s culture of choice. This 
is related to the rhetoric inspired by China’s recent economic development. China adopted order 
and harmony, integral components of Confucian thought, as essential principles to ease the social 
                                                
23 Falk Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” 69. 
24 Falk Hartig, “Communicating China to the World: Confucius Institutes and China’s Strategic Narratives,” Politics 
35, No 3-4. (2015), accessed January 3, 2017 
25 Falk Hartig, “New Public Diplomacy Meets Old Public Diplomacy - the Case of China and Its Confucius 
Institutes,” New Global Studies 8, no. 3 (2014): 348, accessed January 3, 2017 
26 Falk Hartig, “Communicating China to the World: Confucius Institutes and China’s Strategic Narratives,” 246. 
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transformations that ensued simultaneously with economic growth. Similarly, language adopted 
during China’s development, such as ‘peaceful rise,’ ‘harmonious world,’ and ‘lying low’ is 
consistent with Confucian ideology.27 The Chinese government embraced the words ‘peace’ and 
‘harmony’ and equivalent adjectives to project a non-threatening visage to the international 
stage. Thus, the choice of Confucius as the namesake for the institutes is also intimately related 
to endeavors to manage global perception, as the tranquil connotations associated with Confucius 
mirror China’s desired portrayal abroad. 
 Furthermore, Confucius has brand name recognition. Foreigners recognize ‘Confucius’ 
even if their knowledge of China is otherwise limited. Other interpretations of the use of 
Confucius include the interplay between traditional facets of culture and the legitimacy of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC), and Xi Jinping’s government. From the CPC’s point of view, 
the party should be accepted because the morals it currently adheres to originated thousands of 
years ago; the CPC thereby elevates the character and reputation of the regime.28 This is 
intriguing, considering the Maoist ideology that established the CPC regarded Confucianism as 
its antithesis, and actively sought to weaken the presence of Confucius’s followers. 
Subsequently, some experts in the field of international relations find the party’s turn to 
Confucian ideology contradictory and perhaps even hypocritical, which may contribute to cases 
of suspicion of the shift in cultural attitude. 
Structure and Set-up 
Hanban constitutes the Confucius Institute Headquarters, and consists of officials from 
twelve central government ministries. The Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters 
oversees it. The Council includes fifteen council members (ten of which must be Heads of CI 
                                                
27 Xiaolin Guo, “Repackaging Confucius: PRC Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Soft Power” 
28 Chris Buckley, “Leader Taps into Chinese Classics in Seeking to Cement Power,” New York Times, October 11, 
2014, accessed November 3, 2016 
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Boards of Directors abroad), executive council members, vice chairs and a chair.29 Hanban 
manages the founding, funding, and networking of institutes. 
Seoul, South Korea enjoys the distinction of having the first CI; it was established in 
November of 2004. In the initial few years, CIs grew rapidly. On average in 2006, one institute 
sprung up every four days.30 Growth has declined since then. There are currently 500 Confucius 
Institutes and 1000 Confucius Classrooms worldwide. Institutes typically serve a university 
community, while select institutes only serve business professionals. Classrooms are typically 
associated with primary and secondary schools. Some universities offer credit for courses taken 
at the institute, while others do not. The most common form of operation is a joint endeavor; the 
foreign university is responsible for the facilities and a local director, while a partner Chinese 
university provides a co-director and teachers (who are not always available). 31 Hanban sends 
textbooks and financial support to the institute. Both partners are expected to invest in the CI. It 
is common for Hanban and the local university to fund the CI at a 1:1 ratio. Originally, Hanban 
anticipated CIs to inevitably fund themselves, but Hanban has since accepted the need 
(demonstrated by the universities) to continue providing long-term financial support to CIs. 
 Some compare CIs to the British Council, the Goethe Institute, the Cervantes Institute or 
the Alliance Française, international education institutes established by other nations. However, a 
notable difference in these entities is their structure. The institutes founded by European 
countries are not tied to other bodies in the local community in which they’re established. CIs on 
                                                
29 “About Us - Confucius Institute Headquarters,” english.Hanban.org, accessed February 1, 2017, 
http://english.hanban.org/node_7716.htm. 
30 R.S. Zaharna et al., Confucius Institutes and the Globalization of China’s Soft Power, (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa 
Press, 2014). 
31 The motivation for a Chinese university to participate in the program lies in the perception within China of 
various institutions of higher education. The prevalence of ‘international exchanges’ is a marker for evaluation; a 
university with a greater frequency and variety of international partnerships and opportunities is perceived as more 
credible. For more information see: Xiaolin Guo, “Repackaging Confucius: PRC Public Diplomacy and the Rise of 
Soft Power”   
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the other hand, are founded in conjunction with a local organization (most often a university), 
have a Chinese university partner. Both are connected to the headquarters in Beijing, and in 
effect, the Chinese state. The European counterparts do not have a similar relationship to their 
governing bodies.32 The partnerships CIs employ create a “multi-dimensional, multi-layered 
global network structure.” For some scholars, this ‘linking,’ not the sheer number of institutes, is 
the source of soft power.33  
Critiques 
 Various criticisms of CIs have been written, regarding a dearth of teachers, and a 
teaching quality that leaves students wanting. A strong teaching force is required to achieve 
successful results with such a large initiative. Some identify an unmet need of Chinese 
instructors as a lack of enthusiasm among Chinese university professors to teach abroad, possibly 
because CI instructors do not receive additional financial support or experience that would 
warrant promotion. Certain teachers have also expressed reservations about travelling to 
countries of which they are less familiar. In response to this instructor deficit, Hanban has 
recruited Chinese people abroad to serve as language teachers. The main issue highlighted by 
this procedure is the lack of identical teaching abilities between the recruited teachers abroad 
with those of ‘certified Chinese language instructors’ found at Chinese universities. 34 
In addition to a general shortage of instructors, a deficiency of staff skilled in speaking 
local, non-English languages has also received negative publicity. Similarly, certain resources 
Hanban provides are only in English, which can prove difficult to use in non-English speaking 
countries. Other complaints about textbooks include their portrayal of China. Newer textbooks 
                                                
32 Falk Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China” 
33 R.S. Zaharna, Confucius Institutes and the Globalization of China’s Soft Power  
34 Zhenjie Yuan, et al., “Confucius Institutes and the Limitations of China’s Global Cultural Network.” China 
Information 30 no. 3 (2016), accessed January 4, 2017 
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written in the 2000s contain a positive depiction of Chinese people with decreased mention of 
and minimization of social struggles, while those of the 1990s describe more unfavorable social 
phenomenon.35 This exhibits a shift in the narrative China wishes to portray. 
 The Language Law of the People’s Republic of China (2000) dictates that foreigners 
being taught the Chinese language will be instructed in Putonghua and ‘standard’ characters.36 
Certain scholars are critical of this requirement, perceiving it as harmful to a student’s language 
acquisition. Most literature relating to Confucianism and classical texts are written in traditional 
characters. Moreover, the following are often written in traditional characters: texts published in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong – somewhat outside the realm of pressure which might be applied by the 
Chinese party, and scholarly debates on current events that are censored in mainland China. The 
few works predating the 1950’s that have an edition in simplified characters which are the 
‘standard’ characters prescribed by the Language Law typically include interpretations that align 
with the accepted party stance on the topic. Thus, it is argued that foreigners learning the Chinese 
language should recognize traditional characters, which are relevant to and crucial for a 
comprehensive understanding of China.37 Despite the aforementioned limitations (which are 
discussed most commonly in the West), the case study will demonstrate that Confucius Institutes 
are undoubtedly an expression of Chinese soft power in Kenya. 
Concluding Remarks 
 Confucius Institutes are a deliberate effort made by the PRC under the umbrella of its 
foreign policy goals of achieving mutually beneficial cooperation and a more accepted image 
abroad. CIs are intriguing for their interplay between private and public actors across political 
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and cultural borders. There are currently forty-six CIs and eleven Confucius Classrooms on the 
African continent. In the following chapter, this author will establish a theoretical framework, 
which will then be used to discuss Confucius Institutes in Kenya and the significance for Chinese 
soft power and China’s engagement with Africa. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
Culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a 
factor of growing significance in the competition in overall strength…We must enhance culture 
as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people’s basic cultural rights and 
interests. – President Hu Jintao to the 17th CPC Congress38 
 
 This chapter outlines common understandings of soft power in the Western and Chinese 
contexts. It also outlines the definitions of soft power that will be used in the case study analysis. 
Soft Power  
 Joseph S. Nye originally coined the term ‘soft power’ in 1990. Thereafter, pundits and 
politicians have debated the essence of soft power. According to Nye, the soft power of a nation 
consists of three pillars: “its culture (when it is pleasing to others), its values (when they are 
attractive and consistently practiced), and its policies (when they are seen as inclusive and 
legitimate).”39 The essence of this “co-optive power is the ability of a country to structure a 
situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent 
with its own.”40  
Soft power is the antithesis to hard power, but does not constitute the totality of things 
that fall outside the realm of hard power. Military and economic factors are principal elements of 
hard power, and its primary tools include physical force, payments, sanctions, and bribes.41 Hard 
power is able to “rest on inducements (‘carrots’) or threats (‘sticks’)” whereas soft power “co-
opts people rather than coerces them.” Economic might demonstrated through sanctions is not 
soft power. Examples of non-coercive military resources that may augment a nation’s soft power 
include an impressive military reputation, training programs, and cooperation that engenders 
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transnational connections.42 Soft power differs from hard power in regards to implementation as 
well. Hard power requires government involvement – national resources are used to carry out 
coercive actions chosen by the government. Contrarily, soft power develops naturally, 
independent of the political bureaucracy. It can be generated within society by popular culture. 
Moreover, the two forms of power do not depend on one another. Nations are capable of 
performing excellently when it comes to one type of power, and falling short in terms of the 
other.43 
For some, the dialogue transcends both hard and soft power. The effective integration of 
the two forms of power is referred to as ‘smart power,’ which is a popular buzzword for 
commentaries on security and security policy. Proponents of smart power contend there are 
certain situations which cannot be resolved by military action alone, and thereby necessitate a 
skillful utilization of multiple means to achieve persuasion. One such situation would be nuclear 
deproliferation.44 In this case, it may not be necessary to completely dissect the blurred lines 
between hard and soft power, because the two act together. 
 An important distinction made by Nye is the mutually exclusive relationship between soft 
power outcomes and its resources. Soft power is the effect nations seek, whereas soft power 
resources are solely the means to that end. Such “official instruments of soft power” include 
“public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, 
[and] military-to-military contacts.”45 He notes certain scholars mistake soft power for the 
resources used to achieve it because it is an intangible concept, and resources such as population 
and military strength offer a more concrete basis for understanding power. He maintains that 
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scholars who believe hard power can be measured while soft power cannot are mistaken. Soft 
power resources can indeed be quantified.46 However, possessing resources with soft power 
potential does not necessarily mean a nation will achieve its desired objective. In order to 
“[convert] resources into realized power, in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires 
well-designed strategies and skillful leadership.”47 Therefore, there exists a bridge between 
efforts towards soft power goals, and the realization of soft power, creating a disconnect, and 
making it possible for scholars to disagree regarding definitional boundaries of soft power, which 
in turn shapes the dialogue on its applications and limitations. 
Critics of soft power do not necessarily adhere to the definition of the term as it was at 
the time of its inception, stating that it includes “all facets of [a nation’s] national strength except 
the ‘hard power’ associated with military coercion”48 This is exactly the misconception of soft 
power Nye describes. These variations require the reader to remain cognizant of the definition 
provided in the discussion at hand, and take it into consideration when absorbing the evaluation 
of soft power given. When discussing the Western conceptualization of soft power, this thesis 
refers to co-optive power that develops naturally in society, without direct involvement of the 
political bureaucracy. It also does not include economic or military factors. 
Soft Power in the Chinese Context 
Soft power ideas have existed in China since ancient times. Sun Tzu, the popular thinker, 
valued diplomacy over armed conflict. Bound to Lead, Nye’s book on soft power, was translated 
into Chinese in 1992. Chinese scholarship discussing the concept referred to soft power as 
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‘mental power,’ whereas hard power was ‘material power.’49 When discussing China’s use of 
soft power, authors address the issue of defining soft power and assess its limits and applications. 
The existing literature on China’s initiatives is composed of vast disagreements concerning the 
definition of its efforts, but it is rather lacking in comprehensive case studies of specific 
examples of soft power. There is disagreement about whether the original definition proposed by 
Nye should be used, or if the concept of soft power should be altered to suit the ‘Chinese 
context,’ which would entail integrating Western theory with Chinese practice. Varying 
definitions of soft power as it is applied to the Chinese case are present within Western 
scholarship, and across Western and Chinese literature. The differences in term usage are 
important because they denote which efforts and data can be used in an analysis of Chinese soft 
power. Grasping the intricacies of this debate will inform one’s understanding of the conceptual 
divide in the existing scholarship and which topics would profit from further exploration. 
China discerns soft power and public diplomacy initiatives largely as a means of 
“[internationalizing] the voice of China so that it penetrates into popular consciousness and 
influences policy communities debating the consequences of China’s rise.”50 This perspective 
gives way to the belief that soft power necessitates active promotion, rather than reliance on an 
innate quality possessed by the nation, thus leading to the state-run nature of China’s efforts.51 
Due to the PRC’s approach attempting to counteract a certain international perception, most 
scholars view Chinese efforts as rather reactive, instead of proactive.52 
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Public diplomacy is typically understood as an instrument for achieving soft power 
outcomes. As it is understood in Chinese, it is a misnomer for the accepted interpretation in 
English. Wang Yiwei, a leading Chinese scholar of international affairs, notes that more often 
the phrase used in China translates as ‘external propaganda,’ where ‘propaganda’ lacks the 
negative connotation associated with its English-language counterpart, and takes on a meaning 
more similar to ‘advertising.’ The Chinese notion of public diplomacy further differs from that of 
the U.S. in that the Chinese conception of ‘public’ implies the domestic population, and thereby 
necessitates that the same bodies targeting audiences abroad also reach out to the Chinese 
public.53 For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses ‘public diplomacy’ when referring to 
visits to the ministry, online discussions, and lectures, all of which target Chinese citizens.54 This 
method of governing stems from China’s political structure, as it does not possess a single entity 
charged with public diplomacy objectives, and does not have an identical position to the 
undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs as in the United States. There is a 
fragmented quality to diplomacy within the Chinese governing system. For example, cultural 
diplomacy is overseen by the Ministry of Culture, whereas the State Council and Foreign Affairs 
Department’s International Office controls media diplomacy.55 Additionally, people-to-people 
diplomacy is an integral component of the Chinese take on public diplomacy. Intergovernmental 
communication conducted in a formal manner is the mainstay of Chinese foreign policy.56  
China’s public diplomacy tailors strategically determined topics towards particular ‘target 
groups’ on a regional basis. Campaigns regarding human rights are aimed at Europe and the 
United States, as this has historically been a topic of concern for those regions. The dialogue on a 
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‘peaceful rise’ is spread throughout Asia so as to mitigate concerns of potential aggression. 
People of Chinese heritage living abroad are also a ‘target group,’ as China aspires to advertise 
Chinese culture and support their political interests through these people.57   
One scholar notes that when contemplating Chinese soft power, observers on the outside 
looking in often analyze economic relations in addition to other components traditionally 
understood as falling under the hard power classification.58 When scholars view the topic from a 
standpoint in which the ends of soft power are considered more important than the means, the 
possession of influence is more consequential to the discussion than the methods engaged to 
achieve the result. The implication here is that because China is achieving the outcome it desires 
(positive foreign opinions of the nation), economic capacity may be considered a form of soft 
power (despite the original classification of economic ‘carrots’ as hard power). Joshua 
Kurlantzick adheres to this broad definition of the concept as it is applied in the case of China, 
noting that it “implies all elements outside of the security realm, including investment and aid.”59 
This thesis will employ a similar definition of soft power in the Chinese context that includes aid 
and investment. 
Certain Western scholars take issue with the obscure relationship between public 
diplomacy and soft power in China. Their position holds the following: rather than using public 
diplomacy to promote what has been developed “organically” within society, the “Chinese 
government wants to sell its own message.” In this way, there is a “gap between the message 
they might want to promulgate and reality of society on the ground,” which would imply that 
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China is not exercising soft power in the traditionally understood sense.60 Other Western scholars 
echo this interpretation, implying China is employing a “governmental level public diplomacy 
program” instead of soft power.61 This line of reasoning implies the influence China does have 
on the international community is not engendered by “sociocultural capital,” but rather its source 
is “proactive diplomacy.”62 According to this perspective, China’s soft power agenda should 
instead employ a “passive” initiative that excludes anything put forth by the state.63 However, as 
Chinese soft power is situated within the context of the state’s foreign policy, this thesis will not 
exclude government-backed programs from the definition of soft power. 
Commonly Used Evidence 
When the conceptual perspectives on soft power differ between Chinese and Western 
thinkers, contrasting evaluations of their performance in these matters will arise. In spite of this 
disagreement on the precise definition of soft power in the case of China, many scholars use 
similar examples in their discussion, one of which is the media. In fact, media analyses compose 
the vast majority of in-depth examinations of China’s soft power. China has invested billions of 
dollars in transforming Xinhua News Agency, its official news outlet, China Central Television 
(CCTV), and other Chinese broadcasting into media sources that reach the international 
community.64 The State Council Information Office alone spends $10 billion annually on 
propaganda outside of China.65 A common observation is: China is looking to improve its 
standing in the ‘discourse wars’ – information spread globally that can have a positive or 
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negative effect on China, depending on whether it depicts China’s rise as a threat or not. 
Consequently, the typical analysis is China is seeking to balance the Western media’s projection 
of them, especially in developing countries, and particularly through Xinhua.66  In this manner, 
media campaigns are intimately related to foreign policy goals of improving its image. The 
general consensus on the push for a global Chinese media is that they are not meeting 
expectations and are not a beneficial use of resources. As Confucius Institutes are also concerned 
with image management, the case study will provide an interesting source for comparison with 
the pre-existing media analyses. 
 Other examples of soft power given are the allure of the ‘Beijing Consensus,’ China’s 
political and economic model,67 as well as their rapidly increasing participation in international 
institutions68 and regional security organizations,69 such as their involvement with the WTO and 
the troops they have sent on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. Evidence about aid 
is used in accordance with scholars’ definition of soft power – those who consider these ‘carrots’ 
as soft power resources are apt to use them in their evaluation.  
Many scholars cite political practices and domestic issues as a challenge to China’s soft 
power. This reasoning postulates China’s practices do not align with those in the West, violating 
the condition for soft power that a nation’s political values and actions be attractive to foreign 
nations, thereby limiting their soft power.70 One example of a phenomenon regarded as 
acceptable in China’s political realm, yet reprehensible by Western standards, is censorship. The 
Chinese government’s blatant use of censorship is distressing to Western nations, and as such, 
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has a repelling, as opposed to an attractive, effect. Moreover, some scholars contend that 
censorship inhibits soft power in more than a definitional sense; it limits creativity,71 which some 
view as necessary to the development of a civil society that would exhibit soft power naturally 
and draw foreign publics to its popular culture. d’Hooghe concludes that “China seems trapped 
between its aim at perfection in image projection and the structural lack of openness of its 
society, as well as its inability to give up control.”72 
Others claim that the role of the state is helpful in mechanism, but harmful in its results; 
an authoritarian state can be more successful in its strategic use of soft power “because its 
leaders, diplomats, and bureaucrats can be more focused and unified in formulating and 
implementing their policies toward the target state.”73 Despite this advantage in method, 
Beijing’s amicable attitude towards dictators in developing nations and “lack of meaningful 
political reform” nevertheless weakens their soft power capacity with liberal democracies.74 
These relationships and political status engender concerns about legitimacy.75 In response to the 
lack of global popularity for China’s authoritarian practices, the notion of ‘selling their history’ 
is relevant.76 Some Chinese and Western scholars argue that the PRC’s most promising method 
of promoting itself includes its economic record and traditional culture.77 Chinese scholars 
advocate Chinese soft power to emphasize “core values of socialism” and traditional cultural 
values, particularly Confucianism.78 
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Concluding Remarks 
Thus far, media portrayals have received the most attention in analyses of China’s soft 
power, while other potential resources of soft power have not been sufficiently explored in a 
similar manner. Perhaps it is the intangible nature of soft power that inhibits an in-depth 
examination of its application. As such, it would be useful to investigate further to gain insight 
into China’s soft power performance and its influence in the world.  
Although scholars have not arrived at a universal consensus on the definitions of soft 
power and public diplomacy, both in general and in the specific context of China, it is clear that 
the concepts are relevant to a discourse on cultural promotion. This chapter, in conjunction with 
the introductory material outlining China’s foreign policy strategy, forms the ‘soft power in the 
Chinese context’ definition that will be used for this thesis: soft power is a broad tool employed 
in hopes of achieving China’s overarching foreign policy goals of being accepted in international 
relations and regaining great power status. Soft power is both impacted by China’s international 
image, and its intended use is to improve this image. It is generally accepted from a Chinese 
point of view that soft power relates to culture, which is a contributing factor to comprehensive 
national power. If hard power is understood as continuous, then soft power is a “variable or 
multiplier, which could magnify comprehensive power or significantly weaken it.”79 The two 
forms of power work as an integrated team; together they constitute a holistic indication of a 
nation’s power. Also important for this thesis is the view among Chinese scholars that “if ‘China 
opportunity’ can outweigh ‘China threat,’ then China can effectively wield soft power to achieve 
its desired policy outcomes.”80 
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The reader should then conceptualize Confucius Institutes as a component of China’s 
overarching soft power goals and policies, i.e., a tool for China to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives. This definition of soft power in the Chinese context is more expansive and fluid than 
the traditional Western definition (which excludes economic and military factors, and top-down 
governmental actions). 
Numerous scholars believe China has yet to effectively wield soft power. Much attention 
is given to its supposed limits. Despite critical evaluations of China’s pre-existing track record, a 
typical prediction is that their soft power performance will improve in the future.81 In order to 
achieve this, scholars recommend China move away from a top-down approach, and allow civil 
society to do the work naturally. This thesis also concludes China’s soft power has room for 
improvement, but for different reasons that will be explored in the case study. 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework that will be used for discussion. 
Within the Kenyan case study, the thesis will primarily analyze Confucius Institutes according to 
the above definition of soft power in the Chinese context. The thesis will also make use of a 
stricter interpretation of soft power in line with its traditional Western definition for comparison. 
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Chapter Three: Kenya 
[The] cultural foray points to a bigger agenda of inculcating young minds into the Chinese life, 
heritage, culture and language. The vibrant student exchange programme and scholarships 
exposes African students to an alternative lifestyle, with the end game being adoption of Chinese 
culture which in turn fuels uptake of products from the Asian giant.82 
 
 While some views may be quite passionate such as this one, others in Kenya are more 
welcoming towards engagement with China. By looking at Sino-Kenyan relations at large, and 
Confucius Institutes on the ground, this chapter will argue that perspective informs one’s 
interpretation of the activity of CIs, and consequently, one’s perception of China’s soft power.  
Kenya gained independence from Britain in 1963. Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign 
Minister, was present for the independence celebrations, and official Sino-Kenyan relations were 
established a few days later. In 1966, Joseph Murumbi, Kenya’s Vice President shaped key 
foreign policy goals. The objectives Murumbi outlined, which have continued to the present 
include: non-alignment, non-interference in others’ internal affairs, recognition of other states’ 
territory, and peaceful coexistence. Afro-Asian partnerships and cooperation that occurred in the 
1950’s are responsible for the aforementioned policies’ remarkable likeness to Chinese policy.83 
 Sino-Kenyan relations were in flux for the second half of the twentieth century. Bilateral 
ties were dependent on Kenya’s domestic political climate, as well as the international power 
structure. The Sino-Soviet split in 1963 and Cultural Revolution in China led to a less active 
Chinese presence in African affairs. Domestically, Kenya contained competing political factions. 
The ruling power, Jomo Kenyatta and the Kenya African National Union (KANU), perceived 
China’s international support for a revolutionary spirit as a threat, citing China as the inspiration 
for recent assassinations and coups. Consequently, the quality of bilateral relations deteriorated. 
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Despite the turbulence, 1971 brought Kenya’s official recognition of the PRC as the sole Chinese 
government, with their vote in favor of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
outlining the PRC’s status as the legitimate government of China. Relations improved following 
President Moi’s trip to Peking in 1980. Chinese leaders lauded Moi for maintaining Kenyan 
independence from superpowers, whereas Kenyan officials highlighted the potential 
development to be achieved from partnership with China.84   
Kenya’s Value as a Case Study 
The Chinese Embassy in Kenya states that it “remains firmly committed to fulfill its duty 
to promote the mutual understanding, friendly exchanges and win-win cooperation between 
China and Kenya.”85 This language highlights the state’s role in achieving its overarching goal of 
‘understanding,’ but what draws China specifically to Kenya? Oil reserves were not discovered 
there until 2012.86 While China may have since revised their approach, oil was not a directly 
contributing factor when Kenya’s first CI was established in 2005. As China has a glaring need 
to import oil, one wonders why it would become invested in a country incapable of exporting the 
resource. China’s interest in Kenya may therefore be reflective of the broader CI goal of revising 
China’s international image and promoting friendly relationships.  
Other than China’s desire for international acceptance, certain characteristics of Kenya 
may further explain China’s interest for managing their image within and building partnerships 
with this specific African country as well. Perhaps most importantly, the Mombasa Port, and 
Kenya’s coastal location in general, is of strategic interest to China. It provides access to markets 
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in central Africa, allowing China to trade with landlocked countries and expand its export 
destination base. The port is a direct point of access to routes reaching the inner portions of 
Kenya and surrounding countries (for a map, see Appendix). Kenya is purportedly the “African 
hub for the OBOR initiative,” China’s One Belt, One Road infrastructure project connecting and 
establishing trade routes through railroads and ports from Asia to Europe.87 OBOR was 
conceived to expand trade, seek new avenues for growth, and to broaden China’s global 
influence. The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), a major transportation project connecting 
Mombasa to Nairobi (to be completed in 2017), is considered a key component of Africa’s future 
participation in increased trade brought by OBOR, as the East African Community (EAC) 
consists of 93 million consumers. Kenya is therefore geographically crucial to China’s economic 
goals. In addition to China’s desired positive image that would allow it to hold an agenda-setting 
role internationally, China most likely aims to establish and perpetuate cordial ties specifically 
with Kenya through the Confucius Institutes to maintain Kenya as a trading partner. Kenya’s 
location may explain why it is home to four CIs, much more than the typical zero or one, or 
occasional two, for African countries. 
Additionally, Kenya is the largest east African economy, and the largest importer and 
exporter. Within the EAC the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) is comparatively secure and 
diverse. Kenya’s GDP constitutes 40% of the region’s overall GDP. Kenya’s overall economic 
health seemingly has a direct influence on that of its neighbors, and likewise, its progress will 
have positive ramifications for the region as a whole. Kenya is one of two nations in the region 
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that is not hindered in international trade due to a landlocked position.88 Kenya’s role in the 
regional economy makes it an attractive trading partner. Establishing congenial relations would 
have obvious trade-related benefits.   
Trade relations are an integral driving force behind Kenya’s engagement with China as 
well. Kenya began pursuing a ‘look East’ policy in 2003 in order to decrease and de-emphasize 
reliance on Western markets. Subsequently, economic policy has become a considerable 
component of Kenya’s foreign policy.89 The Kenyan government’s Vision 2030 development 
program, envisioned in 2008, targets becoming a middle-income country by 2030. The goal also 
includes a 10% growth rate annually, highlighting the importance of FDI from China.90 
Government officials impress the significance of education to economic prosperity. Of the 
launching of the CI in Nairobi, Kilemi Miria, the Kenyan Assistant Minister for Education 
provided a key insight into the Kenyan government’s attitude towards the CI, stating:  
Our government believes very strongly that investment in education and training 
contributes significantly to economic growth and labor productivity. Indeed the skills and 
knowledge gained through education are fundamental in achieving not only the ambitions 
of the individuals in the knowledge-based economy but also in overall national 
development. It is in the light of this that we believe that the learning of the Chinese 
language and culture will be instrumental in strengthening a cordial relationship between 
our two countries.91 
 
This statement implies the strength and health of Kenya’s economy is related directly to its 
relationship with China, as it is education, through Chinese language, that will spur growth. In 
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this capacity, the government’s attraction to Mandarin is more an extension of fiscal goals, rather 
than admiration for the language itself. 
 The Kenyan government could also be interested in China’s image for commercial 
reasons. China has a clear interest in the manufacturing sector in Kenya. From 2003 to 2015, 
Chinese firms invested $296.17 million USD. From Chinese companies, the manufacturing 
sector received 64% of total investment. However, China has maintained its comparative 
advantage in manufacturing inexpensive products, and its manufacturing sector has permeated 
global supply chains more extensively. As a result, Kenya’s opportunity for trade growth in 
relation to China’s transition to a consumption-driven economy hinges on exporting tourism and 
financial services to China. Additionally, 2014 marked 23% of Kenyan imports originating in 
China.92 Increased interface, both economically and politically, with a foreign actor can cause 
social tensions, which may be further exacerbated by domestic disdain for that actor, or a belief 
that trade is a zero-sum game. Thus, it may be advantageous for Kenya to accentuate China’s 
positives, thereby easing unrest that comes naturally with a perceived external threat the 
prosperity of domestic industries. Alternatively, it would benefit Kenyan officials to overtly 
promote policies that demonstrate to Kenyans they are pursuing economic development and 
national prosperity, one of which is trade relations with China. Either way, trade would 
conceivably benefit from increased cultural understanding. Aid and development assistance may 
be a consideration in determining policy as well. Aid accounts for approximately 5-6% of 
Kenya’s income. According to a 2016 report published by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Kenya ranked third amongst top Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) recipients for 2014, with a total of $2.6 million USD received. The country 
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ranked fourth over a three-year average from 2012-2014.93 From $26 million USD in 2003 to 
$403 million in 2012, FDI in Kenya has risen 35.6% per anum. In 2010, China constituted 57% 
of Kenya’s FDI.94 This evidence shows that China is heavily involved in Kenya’s financial 
activities. Leading up to the 25th African Union Summit in 2015, President Kenyatta remarked:  
The future of our continent cannot be left to the good graces of outside interests. 
Dependency on giving that only appears to be charitable must end. Foreign aid, which so 
often carries terms and conditions that preclude progress is not an acceptable basis for 
prosperity and freedom. It is time to give it up.95 
 
His message regarding ‘terms and conditions’ is clearly a reference to Western aid, and implores 
African countries to abandon reliance on it. This highlights the importance of aid received from 
China. Engaging with the institutes could be a means of establishing a diplomatic relationship 
that would ensure continued aid from China. In this way, multiple forms of economic drivers 
point to a need for Kenya’s government officials to seek amiable relations. 
 Various details about Kenya, and aspects of Sino-Kenyan relations make it an interesting 
choice for a case study, including: 1) Kenya has quite a few CIs (four), compared to the typical 
zero, one or two in other African countries 2) despite not being an oil exporting country through 
the inception and development of CIs in Kenya, China nevertheless pursued partnership with 
Kenya 3) within the east Africa region, Kenya boasts a strong economy and geographically 
strategic location 4) while China has experienced past encounters with other African countries, 
Sino-Kenyan relations stand out as having distinct pivotal events shifting the balance from 
friendly to unfriendly and vice-a-versa 5) finally, Kenya has vested interests in China, which 
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have been expressed by high-level officials. The following section will examine the experience 
of CIs in Kenya with respect to China’s foreign policy goals and conception of soft power. 
Confucius Institutes in Kenya 
There are four CIs in Kenya:  
Kenyan Institution Year Founded Chinese Partner Institution 
Nairobi University 2005 Tianjin Normal University 
Kenyatta University 2008 Shandong Normal University 
Egerton University 2012 Nanjing Agricultural 
University 
Moi University 2015 Donghua University96 
 
 The University of Nairobi (UoN) is home to Kenya’s first CI, established in 2005. The 
outlined goals of the institute are to:  
1. Offer innovative and flexible Chinese courses, not only to students, but also to the 
wider community in Kenya 
2. Act as a focal point to support China-related activities in Nairobi and beyond 
3. Develop and promote teaching, learning and research on Chinese Studies with 
University of Nairobi and Kenya 
4. Act as a resource center for local professionals teaching Chinese as a foreign 
language 
5. Act as an HSK (Chinese Language Proficiency Examination) center for Chinese 
language test and preparation 
6. Act as a consulting center, providing service to the public and private sectors that will 
facilitate improved relations and a deepening of economic links between Kenya and 
China97 
 
While the precise language of the mission statement may vary from institute to institute, the 
message remains rather constant – their goals echo those of the CI ‘Constitution and Bylaws,’ 
namely, to enable Chinese instruction and enhance the bilateral relationship. However, the 
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objectives of this individual institute venture beyond ‘friendliness’ to address economic 
considerations as well, which may be indicative of conditions specific to Sino-Kenyan relations 
and China’s goals in Kenya. 
Confucius Institutes as Exemplary of Soft Power in the Chinese Context 
Prior to the institute’s opening, the University of Nairobi offered Chinese courses within 
the Modern Languages and Linguistics department.98 However, because of the institute, 
members of the community who are not affiliated with the university are able to enroll in 
Chinese classes. In 2009, the University of Nairobi’s Communication department absorbed the 
CI, and a Bachelors degree in Chinese was introduced.99 Students are also able to earn a 
certificate in: Elementary Level Chinese (180 hours), Intermediate Level Chinese (90 hours), and 
Advanced Level Chinese (90 hours). A full sequence consisting of all levels can be completed in 
four semesters, which qualifies a student for the ‘Chinese Studies’ diploma. The curriculum 
consists of speaking, reading, listening, and writing. There is also a ‘Chinese Culture Studies’ 
diploma consisting of ninety hours. Other twenty hour courses offered include subject matter 
such as: wu shu (traditional Chinese martial arts), painting, calligraphy, tai chi quan (tai chi), 
business and trade, tourism, and preparation for the HSK. The CI also sponsors extracurricular 
activities such as Chinese Club, Chinese Choir, Chinese Drama Society, Chinese Corner, dragon 
and lion dances, and dumpling making. As a result of its excellent performance, the University of 
Nairobi CI was pronounced “Advanced Confucius Institute.”100 The UoN CI has shined amongst 
its peers. It is unclear whether or not this is due to pre-existing conditions in Kenya. Similarly, 
Kenyatta University (KU) offers: ‘Certificate in Chinese Language and Culture,’ ‘Beginners in 
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Chinese Language and Culture,’ and ‘Proficiency in Chinese Language and Culture,’ which vary 
in tuition and length. The ‘Beginners’ course is free to KU students interested in learning 
elementary Chinese – a helpful step towards providing a wide audience with at least a minimal 
understanding of China. More recently, a diploma program has been offered for Ksh 98,000. 
HSK preparation, Chinese calligraphy, cuisine, music, and martial arts are also offered.101 Most 
CIs offer enrichment courses such as these that focus on specific aspects of Chinese culture. 
These cultural snapshots provide succinct exposure to positive elements of China – the 
components of culture the Chinese government presumably desires foreign students to 
understand. This is reflective of soft power in the Chinese context for two reasons: 1) it 
embodies a top-down structure purposefully guiding students’ understanding of China and 2) the 
classes serve to construct a positive image of China; topics that have historically resulted in a 
negative view of China are absent.  
However, tuition and fee expenses may be limitations to the CIs’ community 
involvement. Fees potentially inhibit participation of people of lower socioeconomic status, or 
with other financial priorities. General community members are typically charged more for CI 
courses than university students and staff. The increased fee imposes a greater barrier to non-
students, effectively selecting against the community at large for course population. This could 
confine outreach to the higher tiers of society, and fail to touch the hearts and minds of an 
important consumer base of China’s. To address a broader base and enable any member of 
Kenyan society to fall in love with China’s culture, it would be helpful to reduce or eliminate 
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tuition fees. However, this may be unsustainable, so an increase in intermittent reduced-cost 
community outreach programs and events may be desirable. 
In addition to comprehensive language and culture provided in relative similarity across 
all CIs, Kenyan CIs offer areas of expertise found less commonly among other CIs. For example, 
the Egerton University (EU) CI’s emphasis on agricultural training is unique. In 2013, courses 
with an agriculture focus were added to the institute’s repertoire, including Olericulute 
(vegetable growing), Greenhouse Management, and Crop Protection.102 Moi University (MU) CI 
was the first globally to provide a fashion design and textile engineering focus.103 Personnel at 
Rivatex, a textile company affiliated with Moi University, participate in language learning in 
addition to full-time students. The unique variety of programs – agricultural training at Egerton 
University and textile design at Moi University enhances the depth of exchange. Rather than 
applying identical curriculum across all CIs, certain CIs are able to provide specialized 
instruction relevant to the region in which they are based. By adjusting to local needs, CI 
engagement becomes more of a conversation than a lecture. This diversification among courses 
is reflective of the mutually beneficial cooperation the PRC seeks; the CI community gains 
skillsets from industry-specific training, while China garners appreciation for its ability to cater 
to local needs abroad. Furthermore, this is representative of the development experiences China 
underwent with Japan that informed its own approach to providing assistance abroad, and 
consequently, soft power practice. Development assistance is a component of Chinese soft 
power, which is expressed through training courses at CIs. 
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Kenyan CIs are expanding outward in addition to the diversification occurring within the 
institutes. Due to its status as a ‘model’ CI and record of comparatively high performance, the 
University of Nairobi CI was granted about $10 million in 2015 to expand its capacity to serve 
the African continent.104 In 2016, China agreed to provide the university KES $2 billion to 
construct a center exclusively for the CI. The university’s vice-chancellor signed the agreement 
in Beijing, in the Ministry of Commerce’s office. The proposed CI building is projected to serve 
2,000 students with a dormitory, teaching and office facilities, and other public use spaces.105 
Kenyatta University’s CI has expanded by teaching Mandarin to secondary school teachers in 
Nairobi. This is in preparation for KU and the Kenya Institute of Curriculum Development’s 
partnership to implement Mandarin instruction at the primary and secondary levels. The CI at 
University of Nairobi is also involved in the expansion into the nation’s curriculum through the 
development of teaching materials.106 Continued expansion such as this demonstrates China’s 
commitment to image management. Reaching primary and secondary students is an opportunity 
for China to sell itself to the next generation of political and business leaders, and members of 
society. It is also a soft power success in the Chinese context in that the Kenyan community has 
become involved in perpetuating the partnerships, welcoming China’s continued engagement 
with the country, which illustrates the influential position abroad China is striving towards. 
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CI activities have expanded beyond the classroom as well. As of 2014, twenty trainings 
for over 700 agricultural professionals have been completed by the EU institute. The CI has 
partnered with trainees to oversee a twenty-five acre agro-science park.107 160 Kenyan 
technicians have been trained by the China-Africa Joint Research Center, and the China-Africa 
Joint Laboratory of Crop Molecular Biology was founded at EU. Egerton University has 
attracted students from Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Rwanda for horticulture 
training.108 This is reflective of China’s cooperation-focused development aid foreign policy. All 
four Kenyan CIs convened in Nairobi in order to perform Chinese songs and dances for the 
Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) workers. Members of the education sector (CI students and 
staff), politics (government officials from both countries), and the construction industry all 
interacted at the same event.109 Performances beyond institute walls such as this one have 
provided China with a stage to showcase the image it wishes the world would see. Additionally, 
designated cultural weeks, months, and fairs among CIs have given the institutes greater 
potential to reach local people not affiliated with the institute, and introduce Chinese culture to a 
wider audience. However, that same advantage carries underlying disadvantages – the CI is 
limited to a small radius surrounding the event, and people must voluntarily decide to approach 
and explore the event. If advertisement is lacking, then the event may occur unbeknownst to 
many nearby, and those with preexisting negative sentiments towards China may avoid the affair 
altogether, depriving the CI the opportunity to court its most crucial targets. Moreover, much of 
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the interest in learning Chinese is condensed in urban communities, whereas certain areas in the 
north and west have not yet received Mandarin language instruction.110 This should be taken as a 
restriction on the extent to which CIs have impacted Kenya holistically, i.e. its image 
management has not reached all areas and the soft power campaign still has room for expansion. 
Specific information regarding the number and frequency of Kenyan student visits to 
China can be difficult to uncover. However, there is evidence of bilateral exchange. In 
September 2016, twenty students from the KU CI travelled to China to visit Hanban and 
Shandong Normal University.111 Eighteen MU students have earned masters or doctoral degrees 
from Donghua University between 2010 and 2015.112 In the case of UoN, similar educational 
transactions have occurred. Kenyan university staff members were chosen to teach Kenyan 
culture and Swahili language at Tianjin Normal University.113 Additionally, the CIs boast 
scholarship opportunities for study abroad programs in China ranging from four weeks to two 
years.114 From its inception in 2013 through 2016, seventy-eight UoN students were awarded the 
‘Chinese Ambassador’s Scholarship.’115 The China Scholarship Council (CSC) designates at 
least five scholarships per year to Chinese students seeking postgraduate training in Kenya.116 
While the exchange has not yet reached equilibrium in the number of students and instructors 
flowing both directions, the partnership is two-sided, demonstrating an instance of the mutually 
beneficial cooperation China is seeking. 
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While institute operations offer on the ground examples of Chinese soft power in Kenya, 
media accounts are important because they highlight the perspectives held by various parties 
involved. Several motifs can be observed in the majority of Chinese sources reporting on CIs. 
Prior to discussing the institutes themselves, it is common for Chinese sources to reference 
Zheng He’s voyages which occurred during the Ming Dynasty and appear repeatedly in Chinese 
chronicles of historic ties between the two countries. One of the voyage’s ships is claimed to 
have wrecked near Pate Island (off the coast of Kenya), after which the Chinese sailors swam to 
shore and married into the population. The significance of this event is the way in which it 
appears in discourse regarding Sino-Kenyan relations. Interpretation of Zheng He’s voyage is 
largely dependent on the point of view. Chinese perspectives, including official state news media 
and government officials, congratulate Zheng He with much grandeur for his accomplishment of 
establishing ties with East Africa before Europeans. On the other hand, Kenyan sources and 
officials do not reflect a similar attitude, and some express a degree of skepticism concerning the 
validity and meaningfulness of the event. There also appears to be significantly fewer Kenyan 
perspectives on the narrative. This suggests China is more invested in the tale of Zheng He and 
his role as a symbol of a tradition of friendly ties. Chinese media and government officials are 
more active and optimistic in promoting age-old China-Kenya accounts than their Kenyan 
counterparts. The imbalance in number and tone between Kenyan and Chinese outlets of 
descriptions of Zheng He suggests China is more invested in promoting a certain representation 
of the relationship. This signifies a deliberate diplomatic effort by China. The language used 
serves to place China among leading world powers, and to elevate the quality of official ties 
between China and Kenya. These accounts are relevant to the discussion at hand, in that they are 
representative of the diplomatic effort the Confucius Institute initiative is operating within. The 
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gap in Chinese and Kenyan reporting is also significant, in that it reveals a discrepancy between 
the opinion Kenyans have in reality and the one China desires them to have, signifying a need on 
China’s part to continue soft power efforts through the institutes. 
In addition to Zheng He, articles featuring CIs typically begin with a description of a 
cultural event occurring at the institute. Pictures show Kenyans in traditional Chinese dress, or 
performing an activity such as singing, dancing, or calligraphy. A few personal anecdotes from 
one or two students will be shared. Those writing the piece will typically name-drop high-
ranking officials and large crowds (if applicable). The event is framed in such a way that it 
serves to bolster the perceived friendship between the two countries. The quotes from students 
almost exclusively pertain to: their fascination with Chinese language and culture, China and 
Africa’s economic relationship, the manner in which Chinese language would be beneficial to 
their careers, and a desire to travel to China to further their studies. While it is reasonable to infer 
students participating in Confucius Institute activities would have an interest in China, the 
paradigmatic, hyper-positive, ultra congenial language employed is clearly indicative of China’s 
overarching strategy of image management. In other words, Chinese news sources use CI events 
as a vehicle for publicizing friendship and cooperation; news articles on CIs are a soft power tool 
aimed at improving China’s image. 
Language and content focusing on ‘firsts’ in Chinese sources is noteworthy as well. The 
first CI to offer a certain course, compete in a specific competition, or to attain a laudable 
achievement receives ample praise. For example, references to the University of Nairobi’s status 
as the first CI on the African continent is nearly inescapable. The proclivity to stress ‘firsts’ may 
be due to the relatively brief history of Confucius Institutes. ‘First’-centered language also cues 
forward-looking intentions. Referring to an institute as the ‘first’ of its kind implies further 
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development and an intention to establish more institutes with similar attributes, signifying the 
commitment of the government to its state-centered approach to soft power. On the other hand, 
Kenyan news outlets demonstrate a certain degree of indifference towards CIs, in that there is not 
a large volume of articles covering them. When CIs are mentioned, it is typically in passing. 
Convincing Kenyan reporters of positive attributes of the CIs and China in general would serve 
the image management component of the Chinese soft power endeavor. 
Soft power efforts discussed in this section have been unfolding within a largely 
favorable environment. Aside from occasional anecdotal instances of Kenyans viewing Chinese 
negatively because of allegations of illegal trading, smuggling ivory, and perceived xenophobia, 
the typical Kenyan perception of China tends to be positive. According to a 2014 survey 
conducted by the Pew Research Center, 16% of Kenyans viewed China unfavorably, while 74% 
had a favorable view of China. In 2015, these attitudes shifted to 22% unfavorable, and 70% 
favorable.117 A study conducted by the Chinafrica Project between July and August of 2016 
found 77% of respondents believe Kenya’s relationship with China is beneficial, while 8% 
disagree. 85% agreed that their relationship is beneficial to Kenya’s economy.118  
While there has not been a clear indication of an increase or decrease in positive opinions 
in correlation with CI activities, the above polling results suggest China is doing relatively well 
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in Kenya with regard to its image. Several thousand students have been trained at Kenya’s CIs, 
and overall, this should be interpreted as a soft power success. China exposed more people 
abroad to its language and culture, and provided information and resources that were not 
previously available, leading to an overall greater understanding of China. Presumably, the soft 
power successes mentioned in this section will eventually benefit China’s overall image, 
influence, and ability to continue economic pursuits in Kenya. However, slightly different 
conclusions can be drawn when viewing the situation through the lens of a strict interpretation of 
the traditional Western understanding of soft power, which is the subject of the following 
section. 
Confucius Institutes in Kenya According to the Western Conception of Soft Power 
 Since the Western and Chinese approaches to soft power differ, it follows that the case 
study may offer different insights when analyzed according to each definition, and subsequently, 
distinct implications for China in Africa. Differing definitions does not imply CIs should be 
excluded from contributing to the soft power discourse per se, as China has demonstrated its own 
unique conception and application of soft power that includes CIs. The following analysis serves 
only to suggest potential routes for strengthening China’s approach.  
To reiterate, the original definition of the Western notion of soft power excludes 
economic and military elements of a nation’s power. The most crucial evidence when analyzing 
the CIs in Kenya through the lens of the Western conception of soft power is that students 
commonly cite economic considerations as their motivation for seeking language instruction at 
the institute. They have observed an increase in the presence of Chinese companies in Kenya, 
and anticipate employment opportunities. From this perspective, Chinese language becomes a 
commodity on the job market. In this way, it becomes difficult to parse their affinity for Chinese 
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culture from a perceived self-advancement rooted in China’s economic (hard) power. It is 
thereby unclear whether Chinese language has won the ‘hearts and minds’ of the students or if it 
has grabbed the attention of their resumes and bank accounts, which could potentially hinder 
China’s soft power. Despite the students’ aspirations, they discover Chinese companies typically 
bring their own translators from China for the duration of the projects and job prospects for being 
a local interpreter are slim. The students realize their newly acquired skill is not as advantageous 
as they hoped. Furthermore, the CI has been the principal hub for Sino-Kenyan sociocultural 
communication and exchange in Kenya. If they are to pursue Mandarin as a serious marketable 
asset, they typically must travel to China to attain fluency.119 This limitation not only restricts the 
students’ avenues for language practice, but also frustrates the students and hinders the extent to 
which the institute can achieve: greater understanding of Chinese culture, an improvement of 
cultural exchange and cooperation, and the promotion of multiculturalism, three of the main 
objectives of the overall CI initiative.  
Interestingly, the opposite phenomenon has occurred with Nigerian CI students. 
Companies are more willing to reach out to the CI population in Nigeria than in Kenya. While 
the opportunities are not necessarily abundant, they have been able to grow successful careers as 
interpreters, demonstrating an actionable career path to current students. As a result, the students 
maintained relatively positive dispositions. However, since the Nigerian students were not 
denied access to job opportunities as definitively as the Kenyan students, it is not as easy to 
untangle Nigerian attitudes about the culture itself from economic aspirations. Nevertheless, 
China could attempt to improve its image in Kenya by way of advocating for Kenyan acquisition 
of interpreter positions within Chinese companies, which would presumably make their attitudes 
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more positive. In this way, analyzing the CI from a Western perspective of soft power uncovers a 
route through which the ‘China opportunity’ framework can progress further. 
Relatedly, the state-driven efforts of the Kenyan government to promote Chinese 
language and culture learning for economic reasons challenges soft power according to the 
Western definition. This is significant because a stronger prevalence of demand-driven attention 
to the institutes among Kenyan society would strengthen Chinese soft power. In other words, if 
China succeeded in winning over Kenyan hearts and minds with dynamic cultural activities, the 
Kenyans would perceive China and its enterprises more favorably. Consequently, Kenyans 
would be more willing to expand their business dealings with China. A ripple effect would 
impact Kenyan government officials who would be willing to increase business contracts with 
China to garner their Kenyan constituents’ approval in order to maintain power within the 
Kenyan government.  
Also worthy of consideration is the fact that English is the primary language used 
between the two parties when undertaking a dialogue in Kenya outside of the institute.120 This 
implies either: A) a significant portion of the population has not felt the need or desire to learn 
the other’s language to a reasonable level of fluency, or B) there are other more influential forces 
involved, such as the treatment of English as the ‘international business language.’ Either way, a 
richer, more complete partnership would result from elevated efforts to communicate in the other 
party’s language. The use of English implies on a holistic level that not all Kenyans are attracted 
to Chinese culture; increased use of Mandarin by Kenyans would display a higher degree of 
fondness for China. Thus, the soft power initiative has room for improvement in this capacity.  
While the overall attitudes towards China are mostly positive, there are particular views 
within Kenyan society that have yet to be won over. For example, Kenyans connected to the 
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construction industry had a more negative view of China than those involved in other business 
arenas; this may be attributed to speculation concerning China’s alleged use of prison labor, or 
the belief that Chinese workers are replacing Kenyans.121 Additional grievances include 
materials and equipment being sourced from China. Perhaps the state-driven efforts have fallen 
on deaf ears, and a demand-driven affinity for Chinese culture, organically developed among 
these Kenyan construction workers, is the answer to improving China’s image amongst this 
population. 
As this section has highlighted various differences that may arise among interpretations 
of CIs in Kenya when using a Western notion of soft power, the following section will expound 
on the implications for both Chinese and Western interpretations of soft power. 
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Chapter Four: Conclusion 
The Significance for Soft Power in the Chinese Context and Implications for China in 
Africa 
 Several implications can be drawn from the preceding discussion. The most obvious 
significance is different understandings of soft power will yield alternate conclusions for the 
reality of CIs in Kenya. As a result, it can be inferred one’s perspective will inform one’s 
understanding of CI involvement in Kenya. Nevertheless, soft power remains a useful framework 
for analysis despite the different conclusions drawn from the Chinese and Western approaches. 
In fact, comparing the two conceptualizations brought an added dimension to the discussion. 
While the two approaches lead to varied takeaways, it is precisely this contrast that makes soft 
power a useful theoretical tool for gaining a deeper understanding of the situation. A soft power 
dialogue was useful in that it: aided in explaining the CIs’ role within China’s broader foreign 
policy objectives; brought forth strengths and weaknesses in this regard; and illuminated various 
ways in which China could further strengthen its image and influence in Kenya. 
 The observed difference in perception of Chinese soft power and China in Kenya from 
distinctive points of view has broader implications for the scholarship on China’s involvement in 
Africa as well. A significant proportion of Kenyans through engagement with the institutes have 
come to understand the ‘China opportunity’ framework that China desires to achieve for its 
international presence, and thereby contribute a case of mutually beneficial cooperation and 
generally positive involvement to the literature on China in Africa. This is also related to the 
belief among Chinese scholars presented in chapter two – when the ‘China opportunity’ 
framework has greater support than that of the ‘China threat’ theory, China will be able to 
satisfactorily wield soft power in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. The implication from 
 55 
the Kenyan case is then: in developing the ‘China opportunity’ notion through successful 
Confucius Institute activities, China has made impressive strides towards the ability to use soft 
power to its advantage. However, should China wish to gain the trust of those wary of it in the 
West, and to further address the ‘China Threat’ theory, it may be advantageous or even necessary 
for China to address the concerns that became evident through a discussion of the Western soft 
power approach, namely, the inability to separate individuals’ desire for economic gain through 
Chinese employment from a genuine affection for the culture, and the need for the admiration to 
come from Kenyan society, more so than government officials. Essentially, should China wish to 
improve its image in the West by way of its involvement on the African continent, then it would 
behoove it to further distinguish hearts and minds from dollar signs. 
 Another significance for China’s involvement in Africa is that Confucius Institutes are 
demonstrative of China’s approach to development aid, notably through cooperative bilateral 
student exchange and the transfer of agricultural and textile engineering technologies. As a 
result, it can be concluded that China’s soft power initiative and development aid strategies are 
intimately related. More broadly, these partnerships assist in explaining how Africa plays a 
meaningful role in China’s rise (rejuvenation). China is mimicking with Africa strategies that it 
experienced with Japan and the U.S. that enabled all parties to experience economic growth. In 
other words, Africa is crucial to China’s rise because it offers a platform for cooperation, 
influence, and continued financial gain in the form of mutual development, during a time when 
its growth has been slowing steadily. In this instance the significance for Africa would echo that 
of positive aspects of China’s involvement in the continent, namely, that China has provided 
African countries with education, infrastructure, and technology helpful in its development goals, 
and also autonomy and capacity building. 
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Conclusion 
The use of theory provides a set of standard conceptualizations and a streamlined 
approach to the dilemma. Employing a theoretical framework has been paramount in discerning 
the institutes’ relationship to their context. China’s soft power goals are intimately related to its 
overall foreign policy objectives of achieving a well-received image and acceptance 
internationally, agenda-setting capabilities, and the ability to seek continued economic growth. 
Confucius Institutes are a component of China’s soft power strategy, and their performance in 
Kenya reflects that relationship. 
This is evident through structural pathways established by the institutes – such as the 
courses themselves, along with language learning materials that the institutions may not have 
otherwise had. Additionally, scholarships created an avenue for Kenyan students to study in 
China. Specialized training offered through CI courses signifies the role of development 
assistance in Chinese soft power, the possibility for Africa to achieve positive outcomes through 
engagement with China. In addition to increased variety in coursework, Kenyan CIs have also 
reached local communities, which is reflective of China’s desire for a large base of people to 
view it favorably. Despite great achievements made through Confucius Institutes towards 
China’s foreign policy objectives, analyzing the CIs with reference to a Western understanding 
of soft power highlights potential avenues through which China could strengthen its relationship 
with Kenya and consequently further improve its image and ability to pursue its economic goals. 
Although Confucius Institutes have only existed for a little over a decade, which is a relatively 
short time period on the long-term scale that soft power and public diplomacy operate within, it 
is definitely possible that with time, the institutes could improve as a soft power resource. 
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The thesis has various implications for Chinese soft power, Sino-African relations, and 
soft power as a term. Although China and many Western scholars use contrasting definitions for 
discussing China’s initiatives, the term soft power is still beneficial to enhancing one’s 
understanding of the situation. The case study also revealed that Confucius Institutes in Kenya 
are an instance of mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Africa. Since Kenyans 
have come to view China as an opportunity, it could be argued that China has progressed closer 
towards the capacity to wield soft power as it desires. The evidence in the case study and 
discussion of the implications suggests Africa is instrumental in China’s rise, as it is a platform 
for cooperation, economic growth, and influence. Similarly, China’s engagement with Kenya 
through the institutes has had positive outcomes for Africa as well. 
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Appendix  
 
Source: 
http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/2.1.1+Kenya+Port+of+Mombasa;jsessionid=C33
D8FA84648303C871C96737689BDC5 
 
 
Source: http://africabusiness.com/2017/02/11/integration-efforts-in-the-eac/ 
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